The Vulnerable State and Technical Fixes: An Analysis of Official Climate Change Discourses in Nepal by Wong, Pearly
HIMALAYA, the Journal of the 
Association for Nepal and 
Himalayan Studies 
Volume 39 Number 2 Article 5 
March 2020 
The Vulnerable State and Technical Fixes: An Analysis of Official 
Climate Change Discourses in Nepal 
Pearly Wong 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, pwong7@wisc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya 
Recommended Citation 
Wong, Pearly. 2020. The Vulnerable State and Technical Fixes: An Analysis of Official Climate Change 
Discourses in Nepal. HIMALAYA 39(2). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol39/iss2/5 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by the DigitalCommons@Macalester College at 
DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been accepted for inclusion in HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association 
for Nepal and Himalayan Studies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more 
information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu. 
The Vulnerable State and Technical Fixes: An Analysis of Official Climate Change 
Discourses in Nepal 
Acknowledgements 
The author wishes to express her sincere gratitude to the reviewers for their valuable suggestions to 
improve the article, and to Professor Maria Lepowsky for her invaluable inputs to the first draft of the 
paper, as well as Professor Michael Bell for his constant guidance and support to improve the paper. The 
author also wishes to thank the Dor Bahadur Bista Prize Committee for reading and awarding the paper, 
leading to her submission of the manuscript to the journal. 
This research article is available in HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies: 
https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol39/iss2/5 
4 | HIMALAYA Fall 2019  
The Vulnerable State and Technical Fixes: An Analysis of 
Ofcial Climate Change Discourses in Nepal 
Pearly Wong 
I conduct discourse analysis of seven selected 
ofcial climate change policies and documents 
of Nepal. In the frst part of my analysis, I draw 
from international climate justice discourses 
to analyze how policy makers construct Nepal’s 
position in the global arena, in relation to the 
issue of climate change. In the second part, I 
draw from political ecology and anthropological 
understandings of ‘vulnerability’ and 
‘adaptation’ to analyze how policy makers 
construct those terms in the context of Nepal. 
The result shows that Nepal has adhered to 
the ‘vulnerability’ and ‘transition’ discourses, 
which serve as important tools to advocate 
for fnancial support from the international 
climate change regime. Driven primarily by 
international processes and guidelines, the 
climate change policies and documents in 
Nepal project a heavily technocratic approach 
with litle socio-cultural considerations. 
Vulnerability is understood as a static property 
and assessed based on sectors and geographic 
areas, while adaptation is understood as series 
of actions to be implemented. Overall, the 
policies are at risk of perpetuating the existing 
systemic ills, as well as impeding imaginaries to 
pursue more radical socio-political and cultural 
change as efective adaptation measures. 
Keywords: climate change, Nepal, discourse, vulnerability, 
adaptation. 
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Introduction 
“Nepal has negligible contribution on global greenhouse 
gas emissions but impacts of climate change are tremen-
dous, long-lasting and multi-fold both at uplands and 
lowlands. Hence, climate change adaptation is our national 
priority.” (Government of Nepal (GoN) 2010b: i) 
Nepal is a predominantly agrarian, socially stratified 
society with fragile mountain ecosystems in the Himalaya. 
The opening quote is by Madhav Kumar Nepal, the Prime 
Minister of Nepal from 2009 to 2011, in the National Adapta-
tion Program of Action to Climate Change (NAPA), represents 
the country as ‘highly vulnerable’ to climate change and 
thus requires international support to cope with climate 
change. For the past decade, Nepal has been actively 
producing policy documents related to climate change. 
For instance, in a brief submitted to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 
country listed seventeen major climate change related 
policies and instruments.1 
A post-structuralist perspective understands discourses 
as integral with power, which act to constrain people’s 
life choices. Discourses in official national-level policies 
especially could have real impacts in shaping the planning 
and implementation of future governance and actions. 
In this paper, I conduct a discourse analysis of selected 
official climate change policies and documents of Nepal. 
Particularly, I look at how policy makers construct Ne-
pal’s position in the global arena in relation to the issue of 
climate change, to better understand policy making in the 
context of international climate negotiation. I also look at 
how policy makers construct ‘vulnerability’ and ‘adapta-
tion’ in the context of Nepal. These two terms are especial-
ly important, as the definition of ‘vulnerability’ determines 
who are being included or excluded in climate change 
adaptation efforts. Similarly, written ‘adaptation’ measures 
could result in certain pathways to be pursued over others 
in face of climate change. Critical climate change discourse 
analysis thus could help illuminate two aspects: (1) wheth-
er current adaptation measures potentially perpetuate 
the dominant system and thus worsen vulnerabilities of 
populations in the long run and (2) whether the existing 
discourses impedes imaginaries to pursue more radical but 
necessary socio-political and cultural change as effective 
adaptation measures. 
I argue that Nepal’s positioning in the international arena 
affects its policy discourses. In the policy makers’ attempt 
to draw climate change funding support through the posi-
tioning of Nepal as a vulnerable country, they have priori-
tized international guidelines and frameworks, resulting in 
the dominance of depoliticized, technical understandings 
and fixes. These discourses neither adequately address the 
stratified, heterogenous nature of the Nepali society, nor 
sufficiently consider the Nepali people as active agents 
experiencing challenges from multiple socio-political and 
cultural processes. Instead, they potentially perpetuate 
aid and policy dependence of Nepal, and the status quo 
approach to development as economic and technological 
growth. 
Methods and Framework 
My analysis comprises two parts. First, I explore how 
the Nepali state is being characterized and positioned in 
selected climate change documents. This helps to pro-
vide some clues on the contexts in which these policies 
are made. Audet (2013) has identified three discourses in 
international climate change negotiations. I classify the 
discourses used by Nepal in reference to these three dis-
courses: (1) the responsibility discourse which emphasizes 
responsibility for climate change and for reducing emis-
sions first, (2) the transition discourse, led by the European 
Union, which considers ‘transition to a low-carbon econo-
my’ as the means to mitigate climate change and to reduce 
climate injustice, and (3) the vulnerability discourse which 
focuses on uneven consequences of climate change on 
different countries and regions, which serves as basis for 
demanding compensation and funding (Audet 2013). I will 
also examine whether the Nepali discourses are affected 
by non-state actors in the international arena, such as 
the global climate justice movements. These movements 
differ from the three discourses, primarily in their explicit 
appeal to address the issue of equity, as well as transform-
ing the status quo, such as by “keeping fossil fuels in the 
ground” (Bond 2012: 205). 
Second, I critically analyze what constitutes ‘vulnerability’ 
and ‘adaptation’ in those same documents. I draw from the 
political ecology approach to ‘vulnerability’ and anthro-
pological approach to ‘adaptation’ in doing this. These two 
approaches are critical responses to the usual apolitical 
and technical policy process assumed in the international 
efforts in integrating climate change adaptation and devel-
opment (Tanner and Allouche 2011). International policy 
guidelines largely assume vulnerability to be determined 
by biophysical change and marginalization (Nightingale 
2017), and adaptation to be policy interventions decreas-
ing risk or deriving benefits from these changes (Klein et 
al. 2007; Smit and Pilifosova 2001). The political ecology 
tradition, however, shows that biophysical change is 
always mediated through a variety of social and politi-
cal mechanisms (Forsyth 2014; Ribot 1995; Taylor 2015; 
Nightingale 2017). It emphasizes how vulnerabilities are 
built upon power differentials of class, gender, caste, and 
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ethnicity (Mosse 2007). Anthropology, on the other hand, 
refers adaptation to changes in belief and/or behavior in 
response to changing circumstances (Oliver-Smith 2016). 
People do not just adapt to natural features, but also to hu-
man institutions, including all climate change governance 
mechanisms to be established (Birkmann 2011). Many 
ethnographies on climate change demonstrate that, along 
with climate change, communities worldwide are under-
going changing cultural, social, and material lives follow-
ing capitalist globalization and environmental change 
(Rudiak-Gould 2013; Connell 2015; Crate and Nuttall 2016; 
Jacka 2016). Thus, adaptation should be conceptualized as a 
social-political process that mediates how individuals and 
collectives address multiple types of simultaneously occur-
ring changes (Eriksen, Nightingale, and Eakin 2015). 
Using the frameworks above as my reference, I follow 
Tonkiss’s (2012) guidelines in doing discourse analysis. My 
purpose is not to describe in detail the selected documents, 
but to understand how the country of Nepal, as well as 
the terms ‘vulnerability’ and ‘adaptation’ are constructed 
in them. I review shorter documents thoroughly and use 
an open-source, text analysis tool (voyant-tools.org) for 
longer documents to search and analyze Nepal’s position-
ing in the document, and each context under which the 
terms ‘climate change’, ‘vulnerability’, and ‘adaptation’ are 
being used. Many of these contexts are simply names of 
institutions and policies. After taking away those, I identify 
recurring key themes in the rest and classify them under 
‘responsibility’, ‘vulnerability’, and ‘transition’ for the first 
part of my analysis; and ‘apolitical, technical’, ‘political 
ecology’ or ‘anthropological’ perspectives for the second 
part (see Figures 1 and 2). These help me to see which 
perspectives are being emphasized and which perspectives 
are absent. I will discuss each of these themes in my anal-
ysis, drawing quotations from the documents as examples. 
For some themes (such as participatory process and local 
knowledge, see Figure 2), it is not immediately evident to 
which category it belongs. My analysis will provide a closer 
look at the sentences and contexts to determine their 
underlying discourses. 
Documents Selection 
I focus on seven climate change related documents by
the country for critical analysis (See Table 1). As previ-
ously mentioned, Nepal, in a brief submitted to UNFCCC,
has listed seventeen climate change related policies and
instruments. As my focus is on climate change policy
discourses, particularly how vulnerability and adaptation
are represented, I select those which are explicitly focus-
ing on climate change strategies. I eliminate those with
a broader focus (e.g. Sustainable Development Agenda of
Nepal, Thirteenth Plan), those with a narrower, sectoral
focus (e.g. Agricultural Development Strategy, Forest
Policy, etc.), and those addressing merely the ‘status’
of climate change (e.g. Climate change: status paper for
COP15, Status of Climate Change in Nepal). I also include
Climate Resilient Planning, which is not in that list, but
seems rather important in guiding the integration of
climatic risks in Nepal’s development plans and programs.
These choices might be subjected to some limitations. For
instance, as my research does not involve any fieldwork
with policy makers, I am unable to select documents based
on how and why they are produced, though I am aware
that many of them are produced in response to interna-
tional climate regime (e.g. Climate Change Policy 2011,
NAPA and LAPA) (Helvetas and RRI 2011). Nonetheless,
as my analysis shows, these selected documents have
served my purpose of providing insights into Nepal’s own
positioning and how ‘vulnerability’ and ‘adaptation’ are
constructed in the official policy discourses.
Figure 1. Part 1 of my 
analysis identifes and 
classifes recurring themes 
in policy discourses under 
vulnerability, transition or 
responsibility. 
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Results and Analysis: 
Part 1: Vulnerability and Transition Discourses 
A strong vulnerability discourse is evident in Nepal cli-
mate-change documents examined. For instance, in the 
CCP, a statement reads: “Despite having only 0.4 percent 
of the total global population and being responsible for 
only 0.025 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions in the 
world, Nepal will be affected disproportionately, especially 
from increasing atmospheric temperature” (GoN 2011b: 3). 
The document does not delve into the question on who are 
indeed responsible for climate change but rather focuses 
on how Nepal is affected disproportionately. By juxtapos-
ing Nepal’s lack of responsibility in causing climate change 
and the impacts suffered by it, the policy discourses active-
ly establish and present an image of Nepal as a vulnerable 
victim for its international audience. Such vulnerability 
discourses are occasionally presented in conjunction with 
a weak responsibility discourse. The latter is usually to 
endorse an existing idea of receiving compensation from 
historically greenhouse gases emitting countries, rather 
than an overt criticizing of them or the status quo. For 
example, in the Kalapathar document, the fifth declaration 
is to “obtain support of the world community to effectively 
implement projects in accordance with Nepal’s needs... 
Also endorse the proposal requiring developed nations to 
contribute at least 1.5 percent of their GDP to the Climate 
Change Fund” (GoN 2009: 2). The tenth declaration reads 
“Call to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases...draw atten-
tion of everyone to obtain compensation from the coun-
tries emitting greenhouse gases, and relief for poor nations 
and people adversely affected” (ibid). 
Figure 2. Part 2 of my 
analysis identifes 
and classifes 
recurring themes in 
policy discourses 
under ‘technical’, 
‘political ecology’ 
and ‘anthropological’ 
perspectives. 
The language of vulnerability can be viewed as a necessary 
tool or justification to advocate for financial and techni-
cal support by the international climate change regime. 
After all, Nepal has been highly reliant on international 
development aid for the pass decades. The GoN makes such 
intention clear through multiple statements. For exam-
ple, one of the objectives of policies stated in the CCP is 
“To improve the living standard of people by maximum 
utilization of the opportunities created from the climate 
change-related conventions, protocols and agreements” 
(GoN 2011a: 6). In the NAPA document, a paragraph reads 
“the NAPA prioritization process serves as a basis for the 
development of an adaptation strategy that will be able to 
draw financial resources for implementation from national 
as well as various global, multilateral and bilateral sourc-
es” (GoN 2011b: xi). The same document expresses Nepal’s 
expectation for additional funding in addition to existing 
international aid commitment, as such cost was not fac-
tored in when the commitments were made. Such expecta-
tion also aligns with the interests of development agencies 
supporting the making of these documents, as they rely 
on funding allocation to the country to demonstrate their 
relevance and sustain their offices. 
Another strong, consistent discourse apparent throughout 
the documents is the transition discourse. Transition into 
low-carbon development or growth is well embraced by 
the Nepali government and appears consistently in every 
major document. “Low carbon development and climate 
resilience” (GoN 2011b: 6) is explicitly listed as a set of 
policies to be devised in the CCP, along with “Technology 
development, transfer and utilization” (ibid: 8). 
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Document Abbreviation Year Objective/Content 
Kalapathar Declaration - 2009 Declaration on collective commitments on 
climate change and areas of cooperation 
Climate Resilient Plan-
ning 
CRP 2011 Integration of climatic risks in development 
plans and programs to ensure the sustain-
ability of development interventions 
National Climate
Change Policy 
CCP 2011 Enlisting overall adaptation and mitigation 
policies and goals in Nepal 
National Adaptation 
Plans of Action to Cli-
mate Change 
NAPA 2010 Documenting the NAPA preparation pro-
cesses, methods, and criteria for prioritizing 
interventions, key adaptation needs, and 
priority adaptation actions 
Nepal Climate Change 
Support Program 
NCCSP 2012 Providing contexts, strategy, framework for 
management, and monitoring and evalu-
ation to ensure that the poorest and most 
vulnerable in Nepal are able to adapt to 
climate change 
National Framework on 
Local Adaptation Plans 
for Action 
LAPA 2011 Providing principles and stepwise guidance 
for local adaptation framework 
Nepal Second National 
Communication
 to UNFCCC 
SNC 2014 A comprehensive national-level report on 
climate change including national status, 
mitigation and vulnerability assessment, 
adaptation measures, gaps, etc. 
Table 1. Details 
of selected 
climate 
change policy 
documents. 
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This coincides with the Three-Year Development Plan 
2010/11-2013/14 of the country, with the objectives of 
green development and making development activities cli-
mate-friendly and resilient. Such moves align closely with 
Nepal’s self-interest as a mountainous landlocked country 
heavily dependent on neighboring India in fossil fuel ener-
gy supply. As mentioned in the CRP document: 
...it [Nepal] must reduce its dependency on un-
sustainable and expensive fossil fuel, which costs 
Nepal a significant share of its revenue, and seek 
self-reliance by promoting renewable sources of 
energy for fuel-sustainable development” (GoN 
2011a: 27). This foresight is proven relevant with 
the nine-month blockade of imports from India in 
post-earthquake Nepal in Winter 2015 that caused a 
country-wide fuel crisis, adding to the pain of al-
ready suffering earthquake victims (Pattison 2015). 
Accompanying these vulnerability and transition discours-
es, then, is a strong advocacy for technology transfer and 
potential climate finance mechanisms. In the Kalapathar 
Declaration, a paragraph reads: 
With the confidence that by developing clean en-
ergy, we can reduce carbon emission in the region, 
draw attention of developed and neighboring 
countries for the appropriate, modern technology, 
its easily accessible transfer and investment (GoN 
2009: 2).
 Another important agenda outlined in the CCP is to take 
advantage and “mobilize additional technical and financial 
resources from clean and renewable energy development, 
carbon trade and other mechanisms related to reducing 
the impacts of climate change.”(GoN 2011b: 4) Related pol-
icies include “Generating financial resources by promoting 
carbon trade and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)”, 
and “Generating financial resources through the imple-
mentation of the “polluter pays principle” and the pay-
ment for environmental services concept” (GoN 2011b: 7). 
Market instruments such as CDM or REDD+ are consistently 
mentioned in national level policy documents. 
The GoN shows a notable amount of agency through their 
climate change discourses. As discussed by Mathews (2015) 
on the roles of the Mexican government in the REDD 
and REDD+ program as an international broker, similar 
roles are being taken by the GoN, by presenting the good 
candidacy of Nepal as a funding recipient. For instance, 
the NCCSP document, a project supported by the Unit-
ed Nations Development Program (UNDP), compliments 
Nepal for actively taking part in global negotiations and 
constantly raising the issues of climate change impacts 
on mountainous countries and LDCs. The GoN itself often 
mentions their own efforts in fulfilling international com-
mitments. For instance, ‘commitment’ to various global 
initiatives by the GoN is mentioned in both the CRP and 
the CCP documents. Nepal also builds its good candidacy 
through its adherence to the ‘transition’ and ‘vulnerability’ 
discourses—consensus discourses embraced by the Europe-
an Union as well as the developing countries. 
However, the official discourses lack the perspectives of 
a strong responsibility discourse or a justice discourse of 
the global environmental justice movements. The word 
‘justice’ was only mentioned once in the CCP in terms 
of ‘climate justice’ as part of the vision, with no further 
explanation and elaboration in the rest of the document, 
and once in the NCCSP document, as an elaboration of the 
importance of participatory approach. This deemphasis 
curiously manifests a disconnect with Nepal’s internal 
politics. Internally, the country has undergone a ten-year 
armed conflict between the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) (CPN-M) and the GoN, which ended a mere few 
years prior to these documents. The war radically shaped a 
new political awareness on social and redistributive justice 
(Shneiderman 2009; Ojha et al. 2016; Nightingale 2017). 
Externally, however, the GoN has been highly reliant on 
international aid in the past decades, and thus demon-
strates a very pragmatic and externally oriented position-
ing. There is no demonstration of strong, specific advocacy 
for those responsible to reduce GHG emission. Instead, 
in the NAPA document, the statement: “Increased rate of 
greenhouse gas emissions in spite of substantial reduction 
commitment from developed countries” (GoN 2010b: i) 
seems to create an impression that the developed coun-
tries have indeed tried their best. There is also no agency 
shown in acquiring the language of global environmental 
justice movement to formulate a transformative develop-
ment pathway against the international status quo. 
These discourses used by Nepal, along with information 
from existing literature, provide some clues on the con-
texts of climate change policy processes in Nepal. From 
the perspective of developing states like Nepal, the main 
concerns during international climate change negoti-
ations, are the possible restrictions imposed on their 
development efforts, and on securing additional funding 
and resources. Countries of ‘high vulnerability’, such as the 
Least-Developing Countries and the Small Island States, 
group themselves to highlight their needs for support in 
terms of adaptation and mitigation finance, technology 
transfer, and compensation of loss and damage in face of 
climate change (Tanner and Allouche 2011). The Nepali 
state has been in transition after the 1996-2006 Maoist Civil 
War and highly reliant on external donors and civil society 
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to fulfill its functions. Climate change policies such as the 
CCP, NAPA, and LAPA are prepared in direct response to 
international climate regime to which Nepal is also a signa-
tory party, to ensure eligibility for funding from UNFCCC 
(Helvetas and RRI 2011). With international donors as 
the specific audience in mind, Nepal did little beyond the 
global guidelines and depended heavily on scientific and 
technological definitions of climate change vulnerabilities 
and solutions (Ojha et al. 2016). Donors and development 
agencies play decisive roles in these policy processes. For 
instance, the NAPA development process involved two 
senior governmental officials and three donor represen-
tatives in its project executive board. Though multiple 
consultations are supposedly involved, the entire process 
was in English and thus excluding those who do not have 
proficiencies (Ojha et al. 2016). As a result, western and 
technocratic views of climate change are prioritized over 
local perspectives and realities. This will be evident in Part 
2 of my analysis. 
Part 2a: ‘Vulnerability’ in the Nepali Policy Discourses 
In all Nepali policy documents, the concept of ‘vulnerabil-
ity’ has been used extensively in conjunction with climate 
change adaptation. In most contexts, the word ‘vulnerabili-
ty’ refers to susceptibility towards climate change impacts. 
The vulnerable populations are typically defined by sectors 
and geographic areas. For instance, in the NAPA docu-
ment, the mid- and far-western mountains and hills and 
six key sectors (i.e. agriculture and food security, water 
resources and energy, climate-induced disasters, forests 
and biodiversity, public health and urban settlement, and 
infrastructure) are identified as vulnerable. Vulnerability 
is assessed at the district level by overlaying climate risk/ 
exposure maps, sensitivity maps (defined by sectors and 
livelihood), and adaptive capacity maps (defined by human 
development index and food security status) following 
the vulnerability assessment framework of the IPCC. Such 
assessment projects a static and unitary understanding 
of vulnerability, rather than a dynamic process resulting 
from social interaction and power relations. 
Yet, previous studies on community forestry in Nepal, for
instance, found that power structures affect local dynam-
ic in natural resource management, and that the poor are
usually disadvantaged in the decision-making processes
(Acharya 2002; Adhikari, Di Falco, and Lovett 2004; Thoms
2008). As climate change adaptation is about access and
control of natural resources for natural resource-depen-
dent communities, these existing power differentials
matter. Vulnerabilities are not static and unitary prop-
erties of communities, but an expression of complex
socio-ecological relations (Taylor 2015). Work by Pasang
Sherpa (2014) in Pharak, Nepal, for instance, also shows
that while some people are saturated with information
on climate change, others are not at all. Hence, social
heterogeneity and social networks play a role in climate
change adaptation.
Such awareness of social heterogeneity within commu-
nities is not entirely absent in the policy discourses. The 
NAPA document recognizes that the degree of vulnerabil-
ity within the low scored districts may be high due to the 
disparity among the population. It thus calls for vulnera-
bility assessment at the Village Development Committees 
level. However, this suggestion only shifts the unitary 
and static understanding to a smaller scale. Moreover, the 
GoN chose pilot districts for LAPA based on vulnerability 
depicted by NAPA Vulnerability Map (GoN 2010a), pre-ex-
cluding low-vulnerability districts, along with its differ-
ential vulnerable populations from pilot initiatives. Some 
documents also attempt to highlight how poor people are 
particularly vulnerable to climate change and recognize 
the socio-cultural diversity in the country. The NAPA (GoN 
2011b: 2), citing Pradhan and Shrestha (2005), reads: 
Although intermingling between the various 
groups has occurred, they differ widely in the 
details of cultures and adaptations... resettlement 
of the hill and mountain people into the Terai since 
the 1960 ...resulting in an extremely heteroge-
neous and complex Terai population.” The NCCSP 
document further acknowledges that “an unclear/ 
generalized definition of vulnerability has led to 
the dilution of gender and social inclusion issues 
(GoN 2012: 22). 
Curiously, the documents explicitly mention a relation be-
tween power and vulnerability only when it comes to wom-
en. For instance, the NAPA document acknowledges that
women are more vulnerable than men in face of climate
change. Its annex enlists twenty-four ways that women
are disproportionately impacted by climate change in six
different sectors. Section 4.12 of the SNC is dedicated to
gender and social inclusion: “Power relations arise between
the sexes, caste and gender roles in livelihood generation... 
women have less influence in decision making, less secure
resource rights and are more likely to experience poverty”
(GoN 2014: 134). The same section further elaborates that
“climate change, may in fact, worsen gender inequalities by
creating extra work for women, and aggravating their vul-
nerability in poor and socially excluded household” (ibid).
The NAPA also mentions indigenous groups, namely the
Majhi, Rautes, Chepang, and Satar, as disproportionately
vulnerable, not due to power, but due to livelihood sectors
they are typically involved in. Dalit, another marginalized
HIMALAYA Volume 39, Number 2 | 11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
groups in the caste system, are very briefly mentioned once
in three documents, without explanation of how they are
especially vulnerable. 
The emphasis on women is unsurprising. Gender equality 
has always been an important agenda by multilateral insti-
tutions such as the United Nations in Nepal (UNCT Nepal 
2007; 2012; 2017). Indigenous peoples are also getting at-
tention due to international recognition as well as Nepal’s 
own political context.2 In comparison, dalit, as a regional 
and ethnically linked minority issue, is less prominent to 
donors and policy makers, even when there are various 
ongoing ethnic movements in the country (Lawoti and 
Hangen 2013; Upadhyay 2013). 
In short, the Nepali discourses align with the apolitical, 
technical perspective in identifying vulnerable sectors and 
geographic areas. Some understandings of vulnerabilities 
based on power relations can be traced in the examined 
documents, but not explicitly, and with little effects on 
how climate change adaptation measures are planned or 
implemented. Apart from gender relations, there are no 
frameworks explaining how the complex social and power 
relations in highly heterogeneous and stratified societies 
of Nepal could result in different vulnerabilities in face of 
climate change. 
Part 2b: ‘Adaptation’ in the Nepali Policy Discourses 
The CCP summarizes Nepal’s climate change adapta-
tion strategy in one of its goals—“adoption of effective
measures to address adverse impacts of climate change
through technology development and transfer, public
awareness raising, capacity building and access to finan-
cial resources” (GoN 2011a: 5). Such a discourse approxi-
mates the dominant, international approach to adaptation
as a technical and financial matter.3 All the 250 adaptation
options documented in the NAPA are seemingly con-
crete, straight-forward actions given required resources.
The NAPA and CRP documents rightly mention adaptive
capacity as access to services, information, technology,
finance, livelihood options, etc. Yet, there is a lack of
engagement in the text on addressing the possible factors
behind differential access.
Languages in selected documents often frame adaptation
as skills/activities transmitted from external actors rather
than a long-term socio-political process involving belief
and behavior change in the locales. This concurs with
the perspectives of donors, who often must justify their
interventions based on the expertise they can bring to their
beneficiaries. Examples of indicators of adaptation activ-
ities as outlined by the NCCSP document are: “14,300 vul-
nerable men and 21,450 most vulnerable women received
training on climate change” and “18,000 climate vulnerable
poor people benefitted from adaptation services” (GoN and
UNDP 2012: 38). The focus is on people who gain access to
these trainings or services, not on those who were left out.
The importance of understanding behavioral change is only
briefly recognized in the LAPA framework. Socio-political
aspects, such as ensuring equity of access, social, and cul-
tural acceptance, addressing existing or potential resource
conflicts, potential to use local knowledge and technology,
etc., do not constitute adaptation strategies themselves, but
are limited as criteria for prioritizing adaptation actions in
the NAPA document.
Climate change adaptation policy in Nepal also focuses on
the development of new institutions4 or restructuring of
existing ones, but not whether marginalized groups could
easily adapt to their working, and whether they could
themselves constitute the problem of inaccessibility to
services and vulnerabilities of people. This is, again, a man-
ifestation of the technocratic approach underlying most
development interventions that ignores local disparities in
stratified societies. A study by Tiwari et al. (2014) found ex-
isting mechanisms, institutional arrangement, and capacity
of the service provider government institutions question-
able in achieving goals and objectives of the CCP. The lan-
guage of people-centric, participatory, inclusive, bottom-up
planning masks these institutional gaps in implementation.
Instead of employing a framework of ‘justice’, the policies
use the language of ‘inclusion’ and ‘participation’—long
applied keywords in the field of international develop-
ment—which create consent without challenging existing
power relations. A participatory approach is claimed in the
preparation of three different documents.5 For instance,
the NCCSP document reads: “representation of dalit, ethnic
groups and minorities will be ensured in various commit-
tees at the village level and in all cases at least 50% of them”
(UNDP and GoN 2012: 28). The CCP lists: “Capacity building,
people’s participation and empowerment” (GoN 2011b:
7) as a set of policies, among which include “Ensuring the
participation of poor people, dalit, marginalized indigenous
communities, women, children and youth in the implemen-
tation of climate adaptation and climate change-related
programs.” In multiple documents,6 it is stated that 80% of
the climate change adaptation fund should be delegated to
the local level, even though there is no clear statement on
who should make decision about its allocation (Helvetas
and RRI 2011).
There is a broad acceptance within anthropology that 
populations around the world possess intimate knowledge 
about their surrounding environment, allowing them to 
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utilize their resources for social reproduction and physical 
sustenance (Fiske et al. 2014). While local knowledge has 
also been emphasized in the Nepali documents, the under-
standing of the importance of local knowledge seems to lie 
on its utility and transferability, rather than as the means 
to understand the deeper socio-cultural beliefs and insti-
tutions at the local level for better adaptation strategy. For 
instance, the CCP states as one of its policies: “Collecting, 
publishing, disseminating and utilizing climate adaptation 
and adverse impact mitigation-related traditional and local 
knowledge, skills, practices, and technologies” (GoN 2011b: 
8); and the NAPA calls to integrate technical data with local 
knowledge related to understand vulnerability and coping 
strategies. A number of other documents show the recur-
ring themes of local knowledge.7 
In many localities, there are pre-existing stressors, such as
water, health, and food security issues (Barnes 2015; Lynn
et al. 2014; Nading 2014), which might or might not be exac-
erbated by climate change. For instance, the Annex 4 in the
NAPA enlisting local perceptions of climate change impact
also highlights socio-cultural issues such as increased
mental stress and workload, urban migration, conflict over
natural resources, etc. In Nepal, both food insecurity and
flood have long plagued the country’s population in some
districts. The district of Humla has been the target of food
security interventions for decades (Adhikari 2008), before
its identification as a district vulnerable to climate change
(GoN 2010a). Focusing solely on effects of climate change
fails to address systemically imposed social vulnerability
(Fiske et al. 2014). In fact, people may be adapting more
to (and thus reinforcing) systemic vulnerability than to
climate change itself. Mathur (2015), through a case study
of the Indian Himalayas, demonstrates that climate change
could be potentially used to distract wider, pre-existing
structural problems such as negligence of a segment of its
population. In Nepal, a strong coupling of natural disasters
and climate change in the national discourses potentially
masks government incompetence in managing long-exist-
ing social and structural factors of disasters. 
Discourses in the examined documents also make a direct
assumption of the compatibility between climate change
adaptation and national development framework. Refer-
ences to the major national development agenda, which is
poverty reduction through sustainable economic growth,
are evident in most documents including the NAPA, the
SNC, and the NCCSP documents as the guiding framework
for adaptation policies. While it is true that climate change
could undermine development efforts, some development
work can exacerbate people’s vulnerabilities to climate
change. Cannon and Muller-Mahn (2010: 624) posed the
question: “do development processes lead to a parallel
process of adaptation to climate change, or are they a part
of the problem?” Many development projects have been
shown to increase people’s risk to hazard (Wisner et al.
2004; UNDP 2004). Failure to address such question shows
the lack of consideration and comprehension of the drivers
of vulnerabilities.
Overall, climate change adaptation in these documents is 
a technical and financial matter, and series of actions to 
be conducted, rather than changes in the existing system. 
‘Local participation’, ‘inclusion’, and ‘bottom-up’, popu-
lar terms appealing to development partners, are heavily 
applied. Local knowledge is emphasized, not as a primary 
vehicle towards formulating contextualized strategy, but 
as an additional tool/knowledge emphasized in the tech-
nocratic tradition. While traces of socio-cultural dimen-
sions could be found in these documents, they do not seem 
to constitute the major framework or influence adaptation 
measures systematically. 
Conclusion 
The first part of my analysis shows that the Nepali poli-
cy makers and donors have actively projected Nepal as a 
vulnerable but cooperative country, which is eligible for 
climate change funding and support for transition to new 
technology. There are a relatively lack of ‘responsibili-
ty’ or ‘justice’ discourses that seek to achieve equity and 
transform the status quo. Due to the current international 
structure and the logic of aid economy, policy makers 
view the concern on climate change as the opportunity to 
procure more resources for the development of the coun-
try, and avoid overtly criticizing their donors or altering 
international frameworks. From the international donors’ 
perspective, Nepal has done a remarkable job in fulfilling 
their expectations, with its LAPA being globally praised for 
its emphasis on consultative, bottom-up approach (Ayers 
and Forsyth 2009; Nightingale 2017). This mutual interest 
of both donors and Nepal as an aid recipient, has impeded 
imaginaries of Nepali policy makers to pursue alternatives 
involving radical but necessary socio-political and cultural 
change as effective adaptation measures for all. 
The second part of my analysis shows that climate change 
policies and documents in Nepal project a heavily techno-
cratic approach with little socio-cultural considerations. 
Whenever traced, the social, political, and cultural dimen-
sions do not seem to have markedly affected the major 
framework. This shows that policy makers are not com-
pletely unaware of local realities, but these understandings 
have not been used to systematically challenge the inter-
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national guidelines and framework in addressing climate 
change. From the political ecology perspective, Nepal’s 
NAPA and LAPA, consistently address “outcome vulnera-
bility” at the expense of “contextual vulnerability” (Na-
goda 2015: 570), and do not consider structural causes and 
power-relations in the highly stratified society. From the 
anthropological perspective, the official climate change 
discourses in Nepal fail to understand adaptation as a long-
term change in people’s belief system and behavior, rather 
than project activities to be conducted and check listed. 
As there have not been any recognition and discussion on 
systemic ills and institutional obstacles for marginalized 
groups, climate change discourses in Nepal are at risk of 
perpetuating problems in the existing system and worsen 
vulnerabilities of its population in the long run. 
Both parts of my analysis, when viewed together, show 
that Nepal’s positioning in the international arena affects 
its policy discourses. The policy-makers’ intention to paint 
the picture of Nepal as an ideal funding recipient to inter-
national donors, could reasonably explain why western 
and technical perspectives dominate those discourses. 
However, Nepal has been dependent on development aid 
for decades without evident success. Some have character-
ized Nepal’s development as failing and harmful (Shrestha 
1997; Pandey 1999). Viewed from this perspective, the 
global crisis of climate change could have been an oppor-
tunity for the Nepali state to learn how development in in-
dustrialized countries has incurred enormous costs on the 
rest of the humanity. Nepali policy makers and civil society 
for that matter,8 could have taken this crisis as a premise 
to push for autonomy in paving a different, self-reliant 
pathway—one that connects climate change issues with 
the internal political struggles for social inclusion. As 
Nightingale (2017: 15) argues, “climate change in Nepal 
could be framed in terms other than ‘vulnerable’ which 
could lead to alternative priorities and imaginations.” 
Nepal’s geography and recent changes offer a wealth of 
contextualized knowledge and experience to illuminate its 
own path forward. Ecologically, the diverse ecological con-
texts in Nepal means that its population has been adapt-
ing to some of the harshest environment for centuries, 
including recurring floods, landslides, glacier outbursts, 
and the recent 2015 earthquake. Institutionally, Nepal has 
experienced a decade of Maoist Civil War, a transition from 
monarchy to federalism, followed by substantial social and 
political changes. These experiences, if wisely used and re-
flected upon, could spell out a very different policy future 
than an internationally driven one. 
As the country is transitioning into a decentralized, federal 
system, there could be new opportunities at the provincial 
and municipal level. Lessons about the shortcomings of 
the current policies could be useful for community actors, 
researchers or policy makers who will work at the 
sub-national level in the future. At the local level, actors 
could be free from international aid politics, and directly 
engage each other for a more contextualized understand-
ing of local vulnerability and possible long-term adapta-
tion strategy. However, such engagement must build on an 
understanding of the existing discourses and their criti-
cisms. This is where I hope this paper can contribute. 
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Endnotes 
1. The brief can be accessed from the UNFCCC portal at 
<https://unfccc.int>. The complete list of climate change 
related documents include Sustainable Development 
Agenda of Nepal (SDAN), 2003; Initial National 
Communication, 2004; Everest Declaration (Kalapathar 
Cabinet Meeting), 2009; Climate change: status paper for 
COP15; National Adaptation Program of Action to Climate 
Change, 2010; Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping 
in Nepal, 2010; Climate Change Policy, 2011; National 
Framework on Local Adaptation Plans for Action, 2011; 
Status of Climate Change in Nepal, 2011; Low Carbon 
and Economic Development Strategy (LCEDS) draft; 
Environment Friendly Local Government Framework, 
2013 (EFLG); Agriculture Development Strategy, 2015; 
Thirteenth Plan (TP) (2013/14-2015/16); Nepal Biodiversity 
Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP), 2014; Forest Policy, 
2015; Second National Communication, 2015, Technology 
Needs Assessment, 2015. 
2. Nepal has adopted the United Nation Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and ratified the 
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO, Convention no 
169). During Nepal’s transition to a federal system after 
the Maoist civil war, various ethnic and indigenous groups 
have exerted significant influence in the constitution-
drafting process. 
3.  In many cases, climate change adaptation in Nepal is 
about Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) pertaining to Glacial 
Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF), flood, and landslides. DRR has 
been considered as a climate change adaptation strategy in 
the CCP, SNC, and CRP reports. 
4.  Examples include new national-level mechanisms such
as the Climate Change Council and the Multi Stakeholder
Initiative Coordination Committee (MCCICC) for coordination
in planning, the Climate Change and Development online
portal to facilitate knowledge exchange, and the Climate
Change Division and the Program Monitoring and Evaluation
Unit within the Ministry of Education to support climate
change policies implementation. 
5.  The NAPA framework uses a participatory approach in 
vulnerability mapping. The LAPA framework also claims 
an inclusive approach, involving those most risk to climate 
change, economically poor, deprived of public services and 
socially disadvantaged. 
6.  NAPA, LAPA, NCCSP, and CCP. 
7.  Examples include the LAPA Framework which claims 
a bottom-up approach that considers local resources such 
as knowledge, skill and practices in the planning process. 
An entire section 5.2 of the SNC report is dedicated in 
explaining existing indigenous knowledge related to 
climate risk, ongoing studies and documentation, as well 
as reasons for integrating indigenous knowledge in climate 
change adaptation policy. 
8. There have been no major concerns or public 
contestation in Nepal regarding climate change, even 
when hot debates emerged around other policies such 
as the Forest Act and Agricultural Development Strategy 
(Ojha et al. 2016). 
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